On 6th July 2023, a Major Switching Incident occurred with the Central Switching Service ((CSS) operated by the Switching Operator and CSS Service Provider, the Smart Data Communication Company (DCC)). It prevented the successful completion of that day’s planned electricity and gas, supply switches and new registrations. The CSS was stabilised post-incident and any new requests submitted after 9 a.m., 6th July were processed successfully. Through the collective action of the Switching Operator and industry parties, the CSS sent the missing industry messages to give effect to the intended switches and new registrations during the period of the 2nd to the 8th of August 2023. Priority 1 (P1) Major Switching Incidents of this nature are required to be resolved within 4 hours; however, DCC reported it took 1,605.6 hours in this instance. This incident had significant impacts on multiple industry parties and end consumers, demonstrating a clear need for improvement in the arrangements managing switching services and response to major incidents. The Retail Energy Code Company ((RECCo) with the assistance of its Code Manager) completed an end-to-end incident review; to identify the root cause, consider the efficiency and effectiveness of the incident management response, assess the improvements required, and identify appropriate actions for risk mitigation. With the overarching objective that by delivering the identified review recommendations, these actions should limit the possibility, or minimise the impact of, any future major switch incidents. This Issue seeks to deliver 54 review recommendations. 1) Communicating the right message on root cause & for end-consumer comms [review ref. T007 – The Technical Response – Root Cause Info, IM013 – Impact on consumers – end-consumer appropriate info] Affected parties confirmed there were limited, incremental root cause communications along the duration of the incident, until resolved, when a detailed incident root cause was confirmed as part of the incident closure report (6th October, 92 days after the start of the incident). Both the delays in sharing, and the limited information shared, not only caused confusion, concern and left many without the tools to understand what was going on. It made a complicated situation more challenging both for Suppliers to meaningfully engage and assist their end consumers, and for all impacted Market Participants to manage the situation, including making appropriate plans in response to the incident and its resolution. 1) Clarification of existing SO Switching Impact Assessment requirement [review ref. IM015 - Impact on Energy Businesses + & IM017 - Impact on Licences and Codes - SSMS clarification of broader Switching arrangements & IM017 - Impact on Licences and Codes] The DCC, in its role as Switching Operator, does not have a Code requirement to provide analysis on the impact of incidents on Code requirements. To meet the objectives of the REC it is essential that a clear articulation of the incident, its impacts, and the impacts of the actions taken to resolve it on compliance are identified. Where switches and new registrations do not proceed on the expected date, there are impacts to the end-consumer expecting the switch to proceed, and also to Switching parties via downstream, subsequent Switching processes/data/systems covered by REC and across various energy industry codes [including those managing energy trading, reconciliation and settlement, the gas Uniform Network Code (UNC), and electricity Balancing & Settlement Code (BSC), and the electricity Distributor Connection Use of System Arrangements (DCUSA) which can be impacted by registration and settlement issues felt under REC/BSC]. Not only were Suppliers effectively unable to utilise objections, but the incident also saw issues across the switching landscape processes, including; open/closing Meter Reading Disputes, Erroneous Transfers and Settlements. These impacts, if not mitigated by the incident solution implemented, have the potential to lead to potentially unnecessary impacts to businesses as they try to mitigate impacts to them and their end consumers, around avoiding incorrect or late bills, suppliers paying for the wrong period/volume of energy under settlements, or the end consumer being sent to the wrong Supplier. During the incident, there seemed confusion about the broader requirement to ensure any proposed incident solutions considered the impact on the wider Switching Arrangements and who might best assist with this assessment. The purpose of this change is tTo ensure (where possible) the most effective, efficient (time, cost, resource) overall Switching industry solution, industry, with least negative impact to end-consumers, is promoted and implemented. Especially where the incident is not going to be resolved with the REC defined resolution service levels of 4 hours. 2) Communicating the right message ([review ref. COM022 – communicating the right message – SSMS clarification around maintenance of related policies, procedures, processes] RECCo should raise a change to the Switching Service Management Schedule 26, to provide additional direction on a requirement not just to develop a Category 3 procedure, but for DCC in its role as Switching Operator to periodically review, reissue and maintain a: - Switching Incident Management Policy, including defined roles & responsibilities (i.e., RACI) - Switching Service Management Policies & Procedures - Procedure for the review and updating of contact lists for CSS Users, SDSP’s and other interested parties. - Annual testing of Incident Management Policies, procedures, processes, and RACI - RACI clearly setting out hierarchy of needs dependent of Priority of Incident. - clear communications strategy included channels and cadence of meetings in addition to ongoing SOF. - A Major Switching Incident run book. DCC in its role as Switching Operator should complete annual testing of the incident responses processes for incident management.