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I0278 WORKING GROUP
MEETING MINUTES

MEETING	**I0278 Working Group Meeting 4**
DATE	**18 August 2026: 10:00 – 11:30**
LOCATION	**On Teams**

Presenter	Representing	Initials	Role
Francine Peyroux-Sissoko	REC Code Manager	FP	Lead Analyst
Dave Wright	REC Code Manager	DW	Chair
Glenn Sheern	REC Code Manager	GS	Subject Matter Expert
Rebecca Griffiths	Retail Energy Code Company	RG	Proposer

Full attendee list available upon request.

1 WELCOME AND INTRODUCTIONS

The Lead Analyst welcomed attendees to the fourth I0278 Working Group (WG) meeting and invited any additional items of business for consideration during the meeting. The Lead Analyst reminded attendees of housekeeping rules before starting the meeting and displayed the competition law compliance slide. Members should raise any concerns immediately. The Chair told members to be mindful of their conduct in relation to competition law. Members should raise any concerns immediately.

2 REVIEW OF MINUTES AND ACTIONS OF PREVIOUS MEETING

No comments were received on the minutes of the WG meeting held on Tuesday 21 July 2026 and the minutes were approved as a true and accurate record. The Lead Analyst provided an update of ongoing actions that can be found on the actions log:

- I0278WG_0511_A03: The Code Manager share their feedback to the ENA about the EREC. The ENA will come back to the Code Manager with responses in September.
- I0278WG_0629_A06: This topic will be discussed during this WG session.
- I0278WG_0721_A01: Richard Brady asked the ENA and their safety group who will write a joint wording about standard equipment and clothing list. This will prescribe which safety equipment is needed. DW confirmed that nothing is specified in Consolidated Metering Code of Practice (CoMCoP) regarding PPE equipment.

DW informed members that the Code Manager met with DESNZ who are fully supportive of the approach we are taking. They have invited the Code Manager to come present the progress on this Issue at their October SMOG meeting.

3 I0278 BACKGROUND & WORKING GROUP AIMS

DW gave a quick overview of the REC Issue and the aims of the WG and asked members to raise if they thought of any other items that should be discussed. DW opened the discussion,

starting with the remaining questions about the equipment and testing discussion, before going on the safety interference, tampers, damage & sealing topic. Slido was used anonymously to encourage discussion and has been included in the post-meeting papers.

4 EQUIPMENT AND TESTING DISCUSSION

4.1 WHAT EVIDENCE SHOULD BE CAPTURED FROM EACH ISOLATION VISIT?

Members discussed what type of evidence should be captured from each isolation visit, and whether a standard minimum dataset should be captured as evidence, or if a record keeping would be sufficient, considering the balance between collecting evidence to support investigations and avoiding unnecessary administrative burden. There was broad support for capturing the following information:

- Data and time of the visit;
- Property address;
- MPAN number; and
- Possibly the operative who conducted the work.

Other points that were discussed were:

- Seal ID. This will be further discussed during the sealing method discussion.
- Photos of the equipment before and after working on it.

This would protect the individual operative working on the equipment. Members wondered whether a picture should be taken every single time a job is being conducted, whenever the fuse is pulled, or when something has changed and needs reporting. Mandating pictures would support investigation and help with being compliant.

One member mentioned that they currently take pictures of every installation and interaction with the equipment as it supports them for any investigation, and they retain this information for the time the seals are intact. It was questioned whether an interaction label or card with the date and signature of the operative to show when the seal had been last touched could be added. Members believed this would be a good practice, and in the future a digital property passport could be helpful as it would hold the record of unique property reference numbers and MPANs. As it is not possible to have a central database, each company could store their own pictures and only release them for investigation purposes. This would help not causing any GDPR issues. However, it could cause problems when a company has gone bankrupt. Another concern was that pictures would need to be of high-quality to be used as evidence, which might not always be the case. Taking pictures could also be cost prohibitive for small businesses.

Finally, taking pictures as a practice for metering activities is not currently mandated across the REC and CoMCoP. Recently, there have been two REC Change Proposals which looked to mandate this practice for both Distribution Network Operators (DNOs) and Energy Suppliers (R0292 - Obligate Energy Suppliers to provide photo evidence of Theft in Conveyance to Network Parties and R0253 Theft - DNO/Networks not providing photos). However, both Parties stated they would only be able to share pictures on a reasonable endeavour basis. The industry should be aligned with regards to photographic evidence. It would not be possible to add this requirement for standalone SIP only as this could cause more confusion.

Members therefore agreed for photographic evidence to be added as a best practice statement as it would not be possible to mandate at this stage. Should organisations decide not to take pictures, they will have to choose a viable alternative that can be taken for investigation.

- Customer characteristics, such as vulnerability. As SIPs should be aware of the Consumers they're interacting with, there should be some guidance for them to signpost Consumers to their Energy Suppliers, or the Priority Services Register (PSR) should they spot signs of vulnerability. Although it might not be as straightforward as expected depending on the type of vulnerability faced by the Consumer. Should there be medical conditions, there would be other aspects to consider as the property might need to be on constant power. SIPs would also want to know whether there is any vulnerable Consumer before they go on site to be better prepared and signpost them accordingly. A member confirmed that there are nuances between what the PSR can capture and the types of vulnerabilities.

I0278WG_0818_A01: Jemma Johnson to share information about data sharing regarding vulnerability and PSR specifications with the Working Group.

I0278WG_0818_A02: Steve Humphreys and Craig O'Neill to discuss the possibility to work on a joint approach with the National Association of Professional Inspectors and Testers (NAPIT), the National Inspection Council for Electrical Installation Contracting (NICEIC) and the Institute of Electrical Technology (IET) to share best practice when encountering vulnerability on site.

4.2 HOW SHOULD THE INFORMATION ABOUT FAILED TESTS OR UNSAFE CONDITIONS BE RECORDED AND REPORTED?

Members were informed that this does not refer to the method of transmission, and this does not look at the Electrical Installation Condition Report (EICR). Members mentioned a few points such as:

- It depends on the failure and the point of failure as some of it would be under the electrician's control and some of it may be reported to the DNO.

- Standardised safety notices (separate from EICR). Currently MEMs use a safety notice to report any defect to the Consumer for which they would need to get an electrician to rectify in the future. With standalone SIPs, it would be a different situation as they could offer to fix another issue they've identified on site. Some situations would fall under contractual obligations. A member mentioned this would depend on the scope of the work, the type of test that has failed, the type of issue and who is responsible for resolving it. This will then dictate the next steps of the process. Potentially an alternative question would be to know what the SLA is to resolve the issue in an appropriate and safe manner. The SLA will be different depending on the issue, i.e. cross polarity will require knowing exactly where it happened and should be investigated quickly to make it safe; if it's damage to the equipment, it might not cause a major risk and can be made safe first but dealt with later. DW warned that there should be a clear demarcation of responsibilities between DNOs, Energy Suppliers, MEMs and standalone SIPs that will need to be added to the SIP documentation. Everything else will fall under commercial agreements.

- One universal and easy to use mechanism that should not be cost-prohibitive.

- Existing reporting codes. The reporting route needs to be discussed. The current process is to contact the appropriate Party by phone when an issue is identified, either by

asking the Consumer to contact their Energy Supplier directly or by contacting the DNO themselves. There is no data flow in place currently. Members were asked to think about whether this reporting mechanism should remain in place, or whether data flow should be considered for the next WG session.

A central database for SIP activities was mentioned as something to aspire to in the future. The Distribution Connection and Use of System Agreement (DCUSA) is looking to explore the use of multiple portals for every DNO or the use of a central system. If several portals were put in place, this would add difficulty for SIPs as they would not necessarily know where to send information. A subsequent REC Change could be raised to explore the possibility of a central system with the REC technology in ECOES. Richard Brady confirmed that these are discussions about future systems. Should there be a centralised system such as an app, the ENA could be hosting it, and SIPs could use it to communicate with DNOs.

4.3 ARE THERE ANY OTHER POINTS THAT HAVE NOT BEEN MENTIONED ABOUT EQUIPMENT AND TESTING YOU WOULD LIKE TO ADD?

DW asked members if there's anything that has been missed. One member enquired whether the situation could be made worse should the testing processes not be completed prior. DW confirmed it should be added in the training so there is a consistent process of what should be testing and how. There will not be any difference to what a MEM is expected to do. The procedure before removing fuses should include touch voltage of exposed extraneous productive parts, diverted currents, leakage currents, understanding full requirements, and GS 38 voltage indicators. The touch voltage seems to be the most controversial one currently as CoMCoP does not specify how it is conducted and what equipment needs to be used. Whether it is voltmeter, a probe or cycling test lamps, this should be indicated in the training. DW confirmed that the standard test procedure will be maintained as agreed with the DNOs.

4.4 IF A DNO BEGINS TO UTILISE NEW VERSIONS OF EQUIPMENT, HOW SHOULD THIS BE NOTIFIED TO RELEVANT PARTIES (SIPS / MEMS)?

There is currently no process for DNOs to notify SIPs when they introduce a new piece of equipment. This is something that could potentially be added in a weekly update through the REC. The Metering Hub on the REC Portal could be the best place to add that information. It is being updated and there will be a new format on the new portal. Members discussed where exactly on this hub it could be included so SIPs have a straightforward and easy experience to access that information. A dedicated SIP section was mentioned where all relevant links for SIPs could be included, including this information. It could also be added in the FAQ page, and in a technical bulletin that would be sent directly to interested Parties. The frequency of that bulletin would depend on the volume of information that can be shared with Parties, some extraordinary bulletins could be considered should there be some urgent information that Parties need to be made aware of.

5 SAFETY, INTERFERENCE, TAMPERS, DAMAGE & SEALING DISCUSSION

5.1 WHAT FORM OF SEALING METHODOLOGY SHOULD BE UTILISED BY THE SIP?

The majority of attendees (67%) believed the existing type of sealing methodology would be best. They mentioned that it's a well understood system that has proven efficient hence why it

would be sensible to keep it. It is also a CoMCoP requirement, therefore should a new system be put in place, CoMCoP should be amended accordingly.

However, some mentioned the potential to easily identify that the seal would have been installed by a SIP. Another concern with the current methodology is that seals are being provided by three providers with one dominating the market and the lead times can be significant to receive that equipment, sometimes up to 12 weeks. This is therefore a risk for SIPs and for other Parties in the industry. A different methodology could also open a more competitive market. Another issue would be to maintain the register appropriately given they will be multiple organisations, some of them with similar names. Finally, there is a risk for tampers to increase if the same methodology is being used for SIPs as well.

It was highlighted that no matter which methodology is chosen, the seal numbers need to be centrally controlled, the seal usage needs to be auditable, and the liability and ownership arrangements need to be clearly defined. The exposure of seals to the wider industry would also mean increased risks and additional resources needed, which should be thought of in both cases. The REC will have to manage these risks and ensure new Parties are compliant, provide Market Participant Identifiers (MPIDs), and ensure the register is being kept up to date.

DW mentioned that the gas industry uses an AMI seal which is a plastic barrel with a twist lock on it. It is a metal connector with the same tensile strength. Inside the plastic barrel, there is a number that can be used to identify the organisation or the individual operative. These seals can be pre-bought. When on site, the operative will wind it up for the seal to be locked in place. The only way to get the sea off is to cut it. It would in effect work as well as the existing methodology, with the advantage that it could identify easily that it would have been installed by a SIP rather than another Party. DW shared a few examples of sealing pliers such as these twist meter seals and these ones.

Members agreed although the existing process works well, it would be worth exploring other options that might be more suitable for the scale of SIP activities. The alternative would have to ensure the same strength is respected for the pliers, the same structure is respected for the wire and the ferrule as these are currently requirements in the Code. Some amendments might be needed in CoMCoP depending on the option chosen.

One member suggested having a temporary QR code during the first installation so the Consumer can identify the individual or organisation who installed it and their qualifications. This will not provide security but identification. Another option for the identification of the operative could be having Electrotechnical Certification Scheme (ECS) cards. The Energy & Utility Skills Register (EUSR) is currently looking at this area. Although this is a requirement for MEMs with at least one DNO before they can work on their network, this system is not always practical and present some challenges to operatives, especially on construction sites. It might also be a commercial barrier as not all SIPs may be able to hold ECS cards. Should this option be considered, it should not exclude any operative.

6 NEXT STEPS, DATE AND TIME OF NEXT MEETING

The conversation on safety, interference, tampers, damage and sealing will continue at the next working group.

The Lead Analyst reminded members that the next meetings will take place on:

- Thursday 10 September from 15:00 to 16:30;

- Tuesday 6 October from 10:00 to 11:30; and
- Monday 9 November from 14:00 to 15:30

7 AOB

The Lead Analyst invited attendees to provide AOB. None other were raised. The Chair invited attendees to share any further thoughts and input they may have after talking to their organisation to the REC Change mailbox: change.management@recmanager.co.uk, before closing the meeting.

ACTIONS LOG

Action ref.	Action	Owner	Status
I0278WG_0511_A01	The Code Manager to amend the diagram with some explanatory notes, and to expand the responsibilities of SIPs in different scenarios with some supporting documentation.	Code Manager	In progress
I0278WG_0511_A02	The Code Manager to share with members statistics provided by the HSE.	Code Manager	Completed
I0278WG_0511_A03	The Code Manager to share the ENA EREC about fuse upgrades with members when it is made available.	Code Manager	In progress
I0278WG_0629_A01	The Code Manager to share the final survey results from Electrical Safety First with members once it has been completed.	Code Manager	Completed
I0278WG_0629_A02	The Code Manager to check whether the advent of non-compliant devices and the risks they create should be raised as a REC Issue or whether an awareness piece should be conducted for Metering Equipment Managers (MEMs).	Code Manager	In progress
I0278WG_0629_A03	The Code Manager to consider adding an investigation procedure in the SIP's policy detailing the process, and the responsible Parties for the investigation.	Code Manager	In progress
I0278WG_0629_A04	The Code Manager to investigate whether there are any stipulations that make it mandatory for MEMs to use a certain security device on Energy Supplier's meters.	Code Manager	In progress

I0278WG_0629_A05	The Code Manager to draft a list of scenarios where SIPs need to report issues they identify (i.e. faulty equipment, signs of interference, poor installations), who they need to report the issue to, and what the escalation route is for each scenario.	Code Manager	In progress
I0278WG_0629_A06	The Code Manager to investigate how an electrician is currently being notified that a new cutout has been introduced when the DNO would have changed it.	Code Manager	Completed
I0278WG_0721_A01	The ENA to check with their colleagues whether there is a standard equipment and clothing list across DNOs.	ENA (Richard Brady)	In progress
I0278WG_0818_A01	Jemma Johnson to share information about data sharing regarding vulnerability and PSR specifications with the Working Group.	Jemma Johnson	**New**
I0278WG_0818_A02	Steve Humphreys and Craig O'Neill to discuss the possibility to work on a joint approach with the National Association of Professional Inspectors and Testers (NAPIT), the National Inspection Council for Electrical Installation Contracting (NICEIC) and the Institute of Electrical Technology (IET) to share best practice when encountering vulnerability on site.	NAPIT and IET (Steve Humphreys and Craig O'Neill)	**New**

DECISIONS LOG

Decision ref.	Action	Owner	Status
I0278WG_0511_D01	The working group agreed to keep SIPs' activities to a whole current and ensure it will be explicitly stated.	Working Group	In progress
I0278WG_0511_D02	The Working Group agreed that it should be made explicitly clear that SIPs (as individual or organisation) can only re-energise supply they would have de-energise as part of the same job. This	Working Group	In progress

	should also be made clear in the training and handover process.		
I0278WG_0721_D01	The Working Group agreed that earth fault loop impedance should not be part of the SIP role. The earth loop impedance remains part of electricians' activities during the install. The SIP role is restricted to the fitting of the isolator or de-energization and re-energization activity.	Working Group	In progress
I0278WG_0721_D02	The Working Group agreed that SIPs should follow the same protocols as EMOs to prove their equipment is fit for purpose.	Working Group	In progress
I0278WG_0721_D03	The Working Group agreed that a SIP should only be allowed to re-energise a supply they or their company have de-energised, and this should be documented.	Working Group	In progress
I0278WG_0721_D04	The Working Group agreed that SIPs should follow the same standardised test procedures as EMOs.	Working Group	In progress